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Even our Lord in His Passion shrank with an unspeakable horror and a 
mortal loathing from the pains of death. He says so Himself, but with the 
fine point of His spirit, He was resigned to the will of His Father. All the 
rest was only the struggle of nature.
St. Francis de Sales
This is all paradoxical in the highest degree: we stand here before a 
conflict that wants itself to be conflicted . . . .
Friedrich Nietzsche
This paper argues that a prominent theory of libertarian freedom, name-
ly, Robert Kane’s, is unable to accommodate the moral psychology of a 
sinless individual whose decisions have, at some point, been morally sig-
nificant. This is because a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to 
an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires this. Why is 
this important? Because the historic Christian faith generally teaches that 
Jesus is sinless, and, if they are to be consistent, Christians need a theory of 
free action that takes Jesus himself into account.1 Although Jesus is usually 
aBstraCt: In this paper we argue that Robert Kane’s theory of free will cannot accommodate the 
possibility of a sinless individual who faces morally significant choices because a sinless agent 
cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires 
this. Since the Jesus of the historic Christian tradition is held to be sinless, we think Christians 
should reject Kane’s theory because it seems irreconcilable with historic Christian Christology. 
We consider two objections to our argument and argue that both fail.
1. Indeed, Orthodox and Catholic Christians also hold the Virgin Mary is sinless, though 
there are differences in their views. Consider, for instance, Jack Mulder, Jr., What Does It Mean 
to Be Catholic? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), ch. 5, and Timothy (Kallistos) Ware, 
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thought to possess perfect virtue, sinlessness as a state need not be identical 
to perfect virtue, which could be won through a long period of struggle. For 
our purposes in this paper, sinlessness should be understood simply as a lack 
of blameworthiness for particular acts during one’s lifetime.
Kane’s theory of libertarian freedom (hereafter KL for “Kanean Liber-
tarianism”) is widely thought to be attractive because it offers an account of 
incompatibilist freedom that does not require substance dualism, or Roderick 
Chisholm’s “prime mover unmoved.”2 Indeed, after detailing what he calls 
the “theory of agency” model of freedom that avoids determinism and avoids 
relying on quantum indeterminacy, Richard Taylor writes, “One can hardly 
affirm such a theory of agency with complete comfort, however, and not 
wholly without embarrassment, for the conception of agents and their powers 
which is involved in it is strange indeed, if not positively mysterious.”3 Kane 
espouses a variety of event causation that locates indeterminism in the brain 
and that, he hopes, will avoid appeals to mystery and the embarrassment 
Taylor cites. As Kane writes, “The idea [behind his view of free will] was to 
put aside traditional libertarian appeals to special forms of agency or causa-
tion that in the past have evoked charges of mystery or obscurity and seem to 
have no place in the natural order in which we must exercise our free will.”4
How does he attempt to locate free will in this natural order? Kane writes,
There is a tension and uncertainty in our minds at such times of in-
ner conflict that is reflected in appropriate regions of our brains by 
movement away from thermodynamic equilibrium—in short, a kind of 
stirring up of chaos in the brain that makes it sensitive to micro-inde-
terminacies at the neuronal level. As a result, the uncertainty and inner 
tension we feel at such soul-searching moments of self-formation is 
reflected in the indeterminacy of our neural processes themselves.5
Accordingly, KL holds that moments of morally significant conflict reflect 
the indeterminacy generated by “connected neural networks” in the brain.
One of Kane’s common examples features a businesswoman we will 
call “Anne”6 who, while on her way to an important meeting, sees a person 
The Orthodox Church, new ed. (London: Penguin, 1997), 257–60, for some information on this 
topic. 
2. See Roderick Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self,” in Laura Waddell Ekstrom, ed., 
Agency and Responsibility: Essays in the Metaphysics of Freedom (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
2001), 134.
3. See Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 53.
4. See Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 17. Hereafter, citations to this work will be abbreviated with SFW.
5. Robert Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeter-
minism,” in Agency and Responsibility: Essays in the Metaphysics of Freedom, ed. Laura Wad-
dell Ekstrom (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 164.
6. “Anne” is the name Derk Pereboom gives her. See Pereboom, “Hard Incompatibilism,” 
in John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free 
Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 102.
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assaulted in an alley. Self-interest impels her toward the meeting, but com-
passion and a sense of responsibility impel her to help the person. For Kane, 
conflict experienced at the phenomenological level corresponds directly to 
competing neural networks at the neuronal level. Kane writes,
The two networks are connected, so that the indeterminism which 
made it uncertain that she would do the moral thing was coming from 
her desire to do the opposite, and vice versa . . . . When her effort to 
overcome self-interested desires succeeded, this corresponded to one 
of the neural pathways reaching an activation threshold, overcoming 
the indeterminism generated by the other.7
Thus, as Kane says elsewhere, “the indeterministic noise that is an obstacle to 
her making one of the choices is coming from her desire to make the other.”8
Most discussions of KL have focused on its success or failure in rebut-
ting the Luck Objection, the claim that indeterminism at the neuronal level 
seems to translate into luck and not moral responsibility. Kane puts the Luck 
Principle driving the Luck Objection thus: “(L) If an action is undetermined 
at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter 
of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action.”9 Re-
sponding to the Luck Objection has driven much of the literature on Kane’s 
theory since its inception.10 The issue that concerns us here is different. We 
think that Kane’s theory, which purports to rescue our intuition about how 
blame is inappropriate for fully determined actions, renders a sinless individ-
ual impossible. As we understand it, the kind of individual we are interested 
in remains sinless if she is not worthy of blame for particular faults and has 
made morally significant choices: choices some but not all of whose options 
are immoral.11 KL is especially worthy of focus in this respect because the 
very things that are responsible for the indeterminism KL requires, namely, 
the neuronal networks, are themselves correlated to the moral struggles that a 
person encounters. The priority that an agent assigns a given network is sup-
posed to be a function of how deeply she desires the action correlated with 
this network to occur. We argue that a sinless individual who makes morally 
significant choices cannot have the kind of moral conflict that Kane’s theory 
requires, and thus his theory is vulnerable in this respect. In what follows, we 
develop our argument and consider two objections.
7. Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” 165.
8. Kane, “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 419.
9. See Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” 158.
10. See, e.g., the December 2000 issue of The Journal of Ethics, in which Kane and Ishti-
yaque Haji discuss the Luck Objection.
11. Let us adopt Alvin Plantinga’s sense of “morally significant” here, where “an action is 
morally significant, for a given person, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action but 
right to refrain or vice versa.” This, then, trades on Plantinga’s further sense of being “signifi-
cantly free” where our subject is “free with respect to a morally significant action.” See Plant-
inga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 30. 
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Kanean Libertarianism Examined
A central feature of the contemporary free will debate focuses on what 
Kane calls the “Compatibility Question,” which asks whether free will is 
compatible with determinism.12 Almost all Compatibility Question discus-
sions focus attention on the condition of alternate possibilities (AP), which 
serves as a preferred criterion for freedom. An agent satisfies this condition, 
and so is free, only if she could have done otherwise than she did at the very 
moment she did it. However in spite of its popularity, discussions of the Com-
patibility Question utilizing AP tend to stalemate. According to Kane, this 
just means that AP is an insufficient basis for incompatibilist arguments. KL 
thus proposes that a new criterion is needed in order to capture our intuitions 
about free will, including those that undergird AP. 
 Kane finds just such a criterion in his principle of Ultimate Responsi-
bility (UR).13 On that view, an agent is ultimately responsible only if she is, 
first, “responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason (condition, cause, or 
motive) for the occurrence of the action” (and so she is the ultimate source 
of the action). But, second, the choice she makes must be such that the action 
is “explicable in terms of the agent’s purposes, efforts and reasons” (so that 
the action is genuinely intended and she is responsible for it).14 Under UR, 
the agent must be personally responsible not only for what she does, as in AP, 
but also for the sufficient causes and motives that explain why she acts in the 
way that she does.
The most significant feature of UR is its ultimacy condition (U), which 
requires that agents be responsible for the arche or sufficient reason for each 
free action that they undertake. By requiring control over the sufficient rea-
sons for free actions, U ensures that free actions cannot have sufficient rea-
sons for which the agent is not responsible. However, U does not require that 
12. Indeed it is not uncommon to see participants in the free will debate partitioned into 
camps determined by their answers to the Compatibility Question. Compatibilists claim that 
free will is compatible with determinism while incompatibilists deny this. While the literature 
on both views is extensive, noteworthy compatibilists include A. J. Ayer, “Freedom and Ne-
cessity,” in Philosophical Essays, ed. Steven M. Cahn (New York: St. Martin’s, 1954), 3–20; 
Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66 
(1969): 829–39; David Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?,” in Agency and Responsi-
bility, ed. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 30–7. Noteworthy incom-
patibilists include the earlier mentioned Roderick Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self ”; 
Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Peter 
van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,” Philosophical Studies 27 
(1975): 185–99. See also Michael McKenna and Justin D. Coates, “Compatibilism,” in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/
entries/compatibilism. Timothy O’Connor, “Free Will,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/freewill.
13. Kane gives a full statement of UR at SFW, 35. 
14. Kane, “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth,” 407. See also Kane, “Two 
Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989): 232.
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the agent be the “complete or sole cause of the sufficient reason” but only that 
the agent, at some point in the past, made the indeterministic choice to render 
a reason either sufficient or insufficient for free action.15 Thus, factors about 
our genetic makeup, cultural predicament, and family history can have their 
say, but they do not utterly determine our actions. We make the choices (in at 
least some cases) about whether those factors will guide our actions or not.
Similarly, the responsibility condition (R) of UR does not require that the 
agent be directly responsible for every free action. In order to apply UR to 
finite agents, for whom an infinite regress is not possible, some free actions 
that are part of an agent’s life history must be undetermined in the sense that 
they have no archai or causally necessitating reasons. These actions, called 
self-forming actions (hereafter SFAs), are nonetheless under the direct con-
trol of the agent, and are not necessitated (though they are brought about) by 
causes, conditions, or motives. The virtue of this account is that it preserves 
the intuition that our motivations are genuine causes for our actions without 
making them necessitating causes for them.16
In addition to being under the direct control of the agent, self-forming 
actions are will-setting in that by performing them the agent does not simply 
discover her priorities, but actually sets those priorities by choosing. Kane 
writes that the individual is faced with “motivationally viable options until 
the moment of choice or action and would set [her] will one way or the other 
by choosing or acting.”17 Consider the earlier example of Anne, whose two 
motivationally viable options create a conflict between career and compas-
sion. Each viable option would, if undertaken, be undertaken voluntarily in 
the sense that each is motivated by the agent’s preexistent moral character, 
desires, and/or efforts. In addition, the agent has reasons and motivations that 
support each viable alternative. By acting and so choosing which among the 
motivationally viable options is enacted, the agent sets her will and so alters 
the moral character from which future actions will be decided upon.
Anne, in exercising full indeterministic control over her decision, say, to 
help the victim in the alley, could thereby set her will in such a decisive way 
as to make similar future voluntary refrainings from helping effectively im-
possible, without compromising her ultimate moral responsibility for those 
future actions.18 This will-setting feature of SFAs allows free agents to fash-
15. Kane, SFW, 74.
16. For a discussion of how causes can be nonnecessitating, see Elizabeth Anscombe, “Cau-
sality and Determination,” in Agency and Responsibility, ed. Ekstrom, 57–73.
17. Kane, “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth,” 412.
18. An objector might wonder whether Anne is also endorsing this curtailment of her future 
options. In this context, Kane discusses Martin Luther’s famous claim at the Diet of Worms that 
“Here I stand, I can do no other.” He writes, “Luther’s ‘Here I stand’ would have been an affirma-
tion for which he was ultimately responsible, even if it was determined and even if he could not 
have done otherwise, so long as it was a willed action (issuing from his character and motives) 
and he was responsible (as U requires) by earlier undetermined SFAs for the character and mo-
tives from which the affirmation issued” (SFW, 77).
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ion their own wills and so to have direct responsibility for and control over 
their moral character and motivations. As a result, agents can be derivatively 
responsible for actions that are not self-forming and so are necessitated by 
their archai so long as these archai originate from self-forming actions.
Kane would have us imagine that Anne’s indeterministic choice is a 
complex process in her brain composed of neural networks that are chaotic 
and so sensitive to small changes at the quantum level. Kane claims that 
“persons experience these complex processes phenomenologically as ‘ef-
forts of will’ they are making to resist temptation in moral and prudential 
situations.”19 At this point, a reader might be inclined to think that this choice 
represents an uncaused action, rather than a properly self-caused, voluntary 
action of an agent.20 However, Kane responds that the indeterminacy in one 
neural network, such as the one corresponding to Anne’s potential decision 
to help the man being assaulted, is generated by conflict with a competing 
neural network, such as the one corresponding to Anne’s effort to make it to 
the meeting, and does not have a source outside of the agent. In an SFA, the 
agent cannot bring an effort to fruition without first overcoming the indeter-
minism caused by competing efforts. The system of these competing efforts 
and motivations, represented by neural networks, helps to constitute the self, 
or what Kane calls the “self-network.”21 The case, says Kane, is less like the 
rolling of a die to decide what one’s action will be, and more like concentrat-
ing on a mathematical problem, for whose solution the agent is responsible, 
in the face of the “indeterministic noise” of other competing motivations one 
may have.22
A Problem for Kanean Christians
What is clear about Kane’s account at this point is that there will be what 
Elizabeth Anscombe calls necessitating causes and nonnecessitating causes 
at various points in the motivational structure of the agent.23 The nonneces-
sitating causes will be those efforts of will that win out in indeterministic 
decisions that Kane calls SFAs. The necessitating causes will be archai, or 
sufficient reasons for actions that will have resulted from some prior set of 
indeterministic SFAs. But in this context a problem for the initial SFA itself 
comes into view. 
19. Kane, SFW, 130.
20. Richard Taylor differentiates the causation of determinism with what he calls simple 
indeterminism (which holds that some events are uncaused ), and then claims that free actions 
must be self-caused. See Taylor, Metaphysics, 33–53. 
21. Kane, SFW, 139.
22.  For a fuller response to the so-called Luck Objection, see Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, 
and Chance.”
23. See Anscombe, “Causality and Determination,” 69. 
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To see this, consider a case furnished by a scene in C. S. Lewis’s novel 
Perelandra,24 an episode that Kane himself discusses in his early book Free 
Will and Values.25 Lewis’s character, Ransom, upon visiting the planet Pere-
landra (Venus), meets a human-like creature whom he learns has been com-
manded by her God never to leave the floating islands that partially cover her 
world for fixed land. Ransom tells this creature that everyone in his world 
lives on fixed land, unintentionally tempting her to disobey her God. As Kane 
says, “such knowledge brings an end to moral innocence.”26 He further notes 
Ransom’s realization that “they are reenacting the Garden of Eden scene be-
tween Eve and the serpent, and he is playing the serpent.”27
It is here where our question can come into view. Is this Eve character 
(who remains unnamed) experiencing a morally significant struggle? If not, 
then Kane’s theory would not be able to purchase incompatibilist freedom 
in this type of action (seemingly a paradigm case for an SFA). On KL, the 
needed indeterminism is caused by competing neural networks that the agent 
experiences phenomenologically as moral struggle. On the other hand, if the 
Eve character does experience moral struggle, then we need to ask some dif-
ficult questions about her motivational structure (and here we depart from the 
text of Lewis’s case for the sake of simplicity). Supposing that she bears all 
the relevant similarities to human moral agents, she will need neurological 
indeterminacy together with conflicted desires about which course of action 
to pursue. Now, if this conflict is again morally significant, one pathway will 
represent a morally blameworthy choice, and another will represent a morally 
praiseworthy choice.28 But all the while she will be attempting to bring about 
both choices.29
24. C. S. Lewis, Perelandra (New York: Scribner, 1972), 63–5.
25. Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 202.
26. Ibid., 203.
27. Ibid., 202.
28. We choose “morally blameworthy” and “morally praiseworthy” instead of a “morally 
inferior choice” and a “morally superior choice” here. Some have objected to us that it does 
not follow uncontroversially from the fact that an agent could have been better that the agent 
acted sinfully. Perhaps. But either the choice that is made makes the agent sinful or it doesn’t. 
If neither choice would have made the agent sinful, then the option does not seem to have the 
requisite moral significance, since somehow an agent will have to confront choices that could 
render her sinful, and those are the ones that concern us. If, on the other hand, one of the courses 
of action makes one sinful, and the other does not, then the case is exactly the one that concerns 
us, and the objection is moot. Kane notes that “in moral cases, the incommensurable reason sets 
are motives of duty versus self-interest” (SFW, 167). The reasons are incommensurable prior to 
the SFA because to make them commensurable would be to assign them a motivational priority 
in advance, and thus determine the victor of the moral struggle. The point is that they are not 
commensurable yet.
29. The length (in terms of temporal duration) of the struggle is not relevant to our question, 
although it’s certainly easier to imagine a prolonged struggle being one that reflects poorly on an 
agent’s moral priorities. Nevertheless, we are not committed to a particular way of representing 
the struggle. All our argument requires is that Kane’s account sees the indeterministic noise that 
makes an SFA possible as one that results from the dual tryings of the agent. 
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There is, perhaps, something counterintuitive about the idea that an agent 
is at the same time attempting to bring about both choices. It seems not to 
be rational, for example, to try to make two obviously incompatible choices 
at the same time. Furthermore, if trying to make a choice is an active effort, 
then it must be a free effort or its outcome will not be a free choice. KL would 
then also require an account of freedom concerning these efforts of will that 
contribute to an SFA.30 Objections like these, which threaten the very idea of 
SFAs, are independent of ours. However, they are mutually reinforcing: each 
suggests that SFAs are problematic, particularly when no prior free choices 
influence the efforts of will that precede them.
Indeed, our commonplace intuitions would seem to have it that some 
moral conflicts are more severe than others, and that the severity of an indi-
vidual’s moral conflict is correlated with our moral assessment of the agent, 
since sin in the interior of an agent is possible. For example, in Woody Al-
len’s 1989 movie Crimes and Misdemeanors, Judah Rosenthal agonizes over 
whether to have his mistress killed. Her disclosure of their affair would dam-
age his family and career. As we watch the movie, we can imagine it going 
either way (he actually does have her killed). But someone who briefly enter-
tains a murder as a serious and potential course of action and then willfully 
puts it out of her head would seem less blameworthy than Judah Rosenthal. 
Even if he had not committed it, Rosenthal struggles at length with the mur-
der as a real course of action. Thus, we would consider an agent with a 
short-lived—though sustained—impulse to, say, commit a heinous murder 
to be morally less blameworthy (though still blameworthy) than an agent 
who goes through a long, paralyzing struggle about whether to commit one 
(absent any psychological abnormalities).31 But that way of putting the issue 
just reinforces the point. In Kane’s theory, self-interest and duty are making 
the indeterministic noise that makes the other choice difficult, and Kane un-
derstands them as efforts of will. Without the will supporting both paths, there 
would actually be no struggle because there would only be one effort of will, 
rather than two, and none of the needed indeterminism for an SFA. Thus, 
on Kane’s theory, it would be impossible to undergo a morally significant 
30. For examples of this sort of worry, see Randolph Clarke, “Libertarian Views: Critical 
Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 356–85; Clarke, “Free-
dom of the Will,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. Stephen P. Stich and Ted 
A. Warfield (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 369–404; Mele, Free Will and Luck (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). Kane addresses some of these worries in his “Response to Fischer, Pere-
boom, and Vargas,” in John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, 
Four Views on Free Will, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 166–83.
31. Kane’s usual example of Anne the businesswoman is not deliberating about an action that 
is morally heinous in itself (attending the meeting over against helping the man on the street), 
but it is part of the example that her attending the meeting is morally blameworthy in context, 
and that is all that we need.
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struggle and yet have the agent emerge morally unscathed,32 because the req-
uisite indeterminism would come from the conflict between an effort of will 
to do something morally blameworthy and an effort of will to do something 
morally praiseworthy.
An objector might reject our claim that the severity of a struggle is corre-
lated with our moral evaluation of the agent. She might argue that, since some 
struggle is necessary for freedom, one can’t blame the agent for the existence 
of the struggle. In response, it must, of course, be conceded that a garden 
variety moral agent who is purely instinctually drawn toward a lesser good 
can hardly be blamed for the mere existence of the struggle. The problem is 
not with the existence or even the duration of the struggle as such but with 
its source in the agent’s voluntary efforts of will. Indeed, instinctual attrac-
tion to a lesser good seems to us to be what is going on in the case of Jesus’s 
struggle at Gethsemane (Luke 22:39–46). Jesus has an instinctual desire to 
avoid a gruesome death; he does not make a volitional effort to nurture the 
anguish involved in proceeding to it. Jesus therefore can be said to experience 
emotional turmoil although Jesus does not voluntarily intend the struggle he 
undergoes itself.33 This is why, in the epigraph to this paper, Saint Francis 
de Sales distinguishes between “the fine point of [Christ’s] spirit” and the 
“struggle of nature.”34 However, when it is claimed that the struggle, in order 
to be genuine, must have agential efforts of will on both sides of the conflict, 
then we think a Christian should part ways with Kane. For our objection is 
with Kane’s rendering of common sense, not common sense itself. We agree 
that an agent should not be blamed for the existence of a moral struggle per 
se, but that agreement does not mean that Kane’s view of moral struggle is 
the right one.
For Kane’s theory holds that libertarianism requires indeterminism at 
the neuronal level with which agential efforts are phenomenologically iden-
tical.35 This means, as Kane himself says, that agents’ “resistance or impedi-
ment to their efforts to act morally and prudentially is coming from their own 
wills.”36 Kane goes on to write, “Whatever the agents may consciously be-
32. As noted earlier, though, the theory could perhaps persist as a non-Christian theory that 
held complete sinlessness in moral agents who experience morally significant choices to be a 
merely regulative ideal.
33. It has been suggested to us that if a Christian accepted our thesis and consequently held 
that sin is a necessary condition of moral agency for Kane’s view, then perhaps she would sim-
ply believe that Jesus’s agency was somehow beyond the relevant kind of moral agency. We are 
not persuaded that this will do justice to Jesus’s human nature (especially since it seems to flirt 
with the heresy of monothelitism), though it is worth noting that even if one were to produce a 
defensible theory of the Incarnation and atonement on this supposition, then one of us would be 
quite happy to refigure this article as an argument for why Catholics should not be Kaneans, in 
accordance with Catholic teaching on the Virgin Mary.
34. See St. Francis de Sales, The Art of Loving God: Simple Virtues for the Christian Life 
(Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1998), 44–5.
35. See Kane, SFW, 130–2.
36. Ibid., 132 (emphasis in original).
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lieve or avow about the priority of moral or prudential reasons, the fact is that 
if we look more deeply into their full psychological profiles . . . there is some 
doubt and indecision in their minds about this priority. If not, there would be 
no genuine conflict.”37 But here again is the problem: If moral confusion (that 
is, “doubt” or “indecision” about one’s moral priorities, and not one’s set of 
moral information) is a necessary condition for genuine moral struggle and 
the latter is a necessary condition for morally significant incompatibilist free 
action, then it follows that all human moral agents who make or have made 
a morally significant choice are at some time of two minds about what they 
should do. Here Neil Levy’s related charge against Kane’s theory sinks in: 
“Dual control and dual rationality leads to dual responsibility: responsibility 
for what we do, and for what we would have done instead.”38 Note also that 
Kane himself says that agents in this sort of state are “of two minds.”39 It does 
not seem to us an accident that James 4:8 reads “Cleanse your hands, you sin-
ners, and purify your hearts, you of two minds.”40
Indeterminism in the brain (when the brain is in the right sort of chaotic 
state) entails conflict in the agent, but conflict in the agent entails competing 
efforts of will to bring the competing courses of action to fruition. What of 
these competing efforts of will? Kane would no doubt claim that they are not 
yet full intentions, but is he allowed this claim? Certainly, if the efforts of will 
that generate the conflict are purely instinctual, then their bare existence can-
not be blamed on the agent (that would seem to be Saint Francis’s “struggle 
of nature”). But do the efforts of will come with a predetermined strength, so 
that one desire has a strength of ninety and one a strength of ten? Of course 
not; if they did, the priorities of the desires would already be assigned and 
then the victor of the struggle would already be predetermined. The strength 
of the efforts of will is determined by the agent, and in the course of the will-
setting that is an SFA.41 And this must be true so that Kane can escape the 
Luck Objection.42 It is a matter of the agent’s effort, and not chance, that the 
course of action chosen actually wins out.
Nor will it do to argue that to desire an action requires only that a person 
desire an aspect of it, so a person might desire another bowl of pudding even 
if eating it on this occasion would be gluttonous. It is obviously the case that 
agents are not blameworthy for being attracted to an action under a desirable 
aspect of it as long as they are not genuinely in agential turmoil over whether 
37. Ibid.
38. See Neil Levy, “Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians,” Dialectica 59 
(2005): 53.
39. See Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” 170.
40. Citations are from the New American Bible, revised edition. 
41. Alfred Mele calls this the plasticity of moral motivation and discusses it at length in the 
fourth chapter of his book Springs of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
42. Again, if the strength that an agent gives the desires in the course of the SFA itself does 
not determine the victor of the struggle, then the victor of the struggle will not reflect the agent’s 
wishes, and thus will have been a matter of chance or luck.
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to choose a morally blameworthy action itself. The trouble is that neuronal 
networks for Kane correspond to full courses of action and not just aspects of 
them. If these were only aspects of actions, then the winning out of one of the 
networks would inadequately explain the action itself, since on Kane’s theory 
the indeterminism requisite for freedom in SFAs is generated by the agent 
trying to perform each of the conflicting actions, and not merely by being at-
tracted to one aspect of each of them. As Kane writes in his businesswoman 
example, “she will have succeeded in doing what she was trying to do. And 
the interesting thing is that this will be true of her, whichever choice is made, 
because she was trying to make both choices and one is going to succeed.”43
Thus, consider a situation where one encounters a person on the side 
of the road who is in dire need of assistance while driving to one’s son’s 
baseball game, even as the first pitch is approaching. Now suppose that one 
promised to make it to the game in time for the first pitch, and that the need 
of the stranger is so dire that not providing assistance would constitute a 
moral fault, even in the face of the countervailing promise. If one struggles 
morally over this decision, what is the struggle between? Surely it can’t be 
between one’s inclination to keep a promise and one’s inclination to provide 
some assistance to a stranger (which are both morally praiseworthy aspects 
of each action). Such struggles are too vague to be morally significant, even 
if the agent were happily to alight on those features rather than some other set 
of features. Rather, the struggle needs to be between keeping this promise of 
this gravity as compared with this person in this situation who needs this sort 
of assistance. Only that kind of struggle will genuinely form the moral self of 
the person in question, as self-forming actions must. But these latter descrip-
tions of the choice are too thick to be simply aspects of an action; rather, they 
constitute the action in its morally relevant features.
It is a fair point that the dual efforts of will Kane espouses here, such 
that our agent’s choice, or Anne’s choice, is the result of really trying to make 
both decisions at once, reflects a modification of Kane’s original view, which 
appears to be part of his attempt to respond to the Luck Objection.44 Indeed, 
one dilemma for Kane here, as Randolph Clarke notes,45 is that holding that 
the efforts of will are undetermined by the agent is just succumbing to the 
Luck Objection, but holding that the efforts of will that result in a decision 
are themselves determined by the agent threatens a regress of responsibility. 
Thus, at this point, one might argue that Kane’s theory is simply incoherent, 
since, if an SFA is to bring an agent’s will into being, then it makes no sense 
to appeal to dual agential tryings that exist prior to the agent’s decision. We 
are agnostic about whether Kane’s theory can respond to this challenge suc-
43. See Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” 170.
44. See Randolph Clarke, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/en-
cyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=incompatibilism-theories, esp. sec. 2.3.
45. Ibid.
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cessfully. If he is successful, it will have to be by assigning agential control to 
both of the dual efforts of willing. But even if Kane can respond to Clarke’s 
regress challenge, we still think that a sinless individual (who makes morally 
significant choices) is impossible on that account.
Our objection to Kane’s theory can be put simply, however misleadingly, 
as follows: since both competing efforts of will in a morally significant deci-
sion are the work of the agent, the agent is in effect playing chess with her-
self. She knows in advance that she will win, but she does not know whether 
she will represent the white side or the black side. But why is she doing this 
with her moral character? Admittedly, the analogy breaks down because in a 
game of chess, as in a game of baseball, one can advance one’s queen while 
knowing that the knight will take it later; one can throw the game. But here 
the agent cannot even know the priorities that she will assign to each of the 
competing efforts, or else the struggle is already preempted. A genuine moral 
struggle, for Kane, entails the voluntary, and not just instinctual, valuing, 
however slight, of a morally blameworthy course of action. To boil the argu-
ment down to a dilemma: in a context of a morally significant indeterministic 
choice, Kane must either hold that conflicting desires acquire their priorities 
through the willing of the agent or claim that they do not. If the former, the 
agent cannot be sinless. If, on the other hand, immoral desires acquire their 
priorities through other factors such as instinct, succumbing to or resisting 
the immoral desire cannot be genuinely voluntary. This is certainly a dilem-
ma, but since both options are likely to be unsatisfactory to a great number of 
(incompatibilist) Christian theists, we think that KL is problematic for them.
Some Further Objections
We have argued that Kane’s theory of libertarian freedom cannot support 
the existence of a sinless individual who faces a morally significant choice. 
This should be troubling to Christian theists who hold that (at least) one hu-
man being was in fact sinless. Yet, we believe that the theory is unable to 
support this element of Christian orthodoxy because it must hold that the 
valuing of the desires that generate moral struggle (which in turn is a neces-
sary condition for libertarian freedom on KL) is the voluntary work of the 
agent, and a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral 
desire. In this section, we will respond to two remaining objections that we 
anticipate to our argument.
Objection 1
It’s perfectly ordinary for an agent to be in a conflict between one instinc-
tual motive and another moral motive. But Kane’s theory can make sense of 
this, since the winning out of the moral motive is just the victory of free will 
over animal instinct. It is simply autonomy winning out over heteronomy. So, 
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when a sinless individual confronts such a situation, she summarily closes off 
the pathway to the action dictated by instinct. If she does this in such a sum-
mary fashion, then her character cannot be impugned because of it, and she 
retains her spotless moral standing.
Response
As we have already acknowledged, free agents are not blameworthy for 
their instincts insofar as they are outside of the agent’s control. However, 
there is a distinction between having an instinct and being of two minds with 
respect to the course of action dictated by instinct. Accordingly, Objection 1 
treats the instinct as if its priority were already assigned. But it is not; it is the 
agent’s job to determine the priority of each viable option in the context of 
this intra-agent struggle. If this priority were not assigned by the agent, then 
the action would be predetermined by external factors and so not free in the 
sense of UR.46
Objection 2
Suppose we try a different strategy. Suppose that we concede that one 
type of theoretically “spotless” agent is not a possibility. However, we may 
be able to rescue the moral-phenomenological character and experience of 
the sinless moral agent. As much as we Kaneans need to insist that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between neurological events in the self-network 
and the phenomenology of the agent, some neurological events may be too 
minute to make a phenomenological dent. Neurologically, the agent may 
asymptotically approach, and never quite reach, theoretical sinlessness. But 
perhaps an agent is so morally sturdy as to have this neurological struggle 
never make a practical difference. In this case, we can retain everything we 
need to about a sinless agent.
Response
Two problems arise with this objection. In practically sinless agents, by 
hypothesis, this neurological conflict in some SFAs is too minute to make a 
phenomenological dent and so does not make a practical difference in our 
moral evaluation of the agent. But how are these minute neurological con-
flicts possible? Kane argues that in SFA scenarios the brain moves out of 
thermodynamic equilibrium and into a chaotic state. As a chaotic system, 
the brain exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions so that small 
46. One possible exception to this is if the predetermined strength of two options is perfectly 
equal. But in this case the result is not an SFA but paralyzing indecision and angst (and, perhaps, 
moral blameworthiness for a sin of omission). If the predetermined strength were not perfectly 
equal but only equal enough (in some unspecified way), then the result of this might be a chaotic 
state that would need to be resolved by a decision. If this new decision were again free, there 
would be indeterminism and so an SFA situation would be produced. But in this case, as in other 
genuine SFA situations, the agent assigns priorities by acting and so chooses which outcome to 
actualize. If this is not the case, then the agent is back in a situation of luck. If it is the case, then 
everything we say still applies.
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changes on the quantum level are amplified and so manifested on the neu-
rological level. Objection 2 claims that small changes can be made to this 
system without producing large scale effects. Yet, the impact of such changes 
is impossible to predict in these chaotic systems. Any change will become 
amplified over time and so the small changes that the objector requires will 
(or at minimum may) quickly become big changes. So, at best, the loss of 
correspondence between phenomenology and neurology accepts some sig-
nificant aspect of agential luck.
Perhaps more importantly for this paper, though, neurological conflicts 
do often make a phenomenological dent in sinless beings. For example, Je-
sus’s struggle in Gethsemane is certainly not a small one. Luke 22:44 tells 
us that “[Jesus] was in such agony and he prayed so fervently that his sweat 
became like drops of blood falling on the ground.” This clearly does make 
a phenomenological dent, and so the objector’s strategy does not do justice 
to this paradigm case. Kane’s theory would hardly be very attractive if it 
could only explain moral struggles that are phenomenologically undetectable 
to the agent and to others, but that is the concession that would be required 
if the struggle is supposed to be only neurological and not phenomenologi-
cal. Moreover, at the theoretical level, if there is only a loose connection 
between the neurological and phenomenological spheres, then Kane’s theory 
loses much of its appeal to metaphysicians. If the chaotic brain state required 
by KL obtains but without the requisite struggle then KL appears to endorse 
a kind of dualism between mind and body and to become the very kind of 
agent-causal account that it was trying to avoid.47
Conclusion
Our argument in this paper is that Kane’s theory of libertarian freedom 
cannot accommodate the existence of a sinless individual, because a sinless 
agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire. We maintain that 
this is problematic for Christians, for whom the heavy weight of tradition 
holds that Jesus of Nazareth is sinless. There are, of course, some free actions 
that are not morally charged. For example, Kane’s widely referenced exam-
ple of Jane’s undetermined decision to fly to Hawaii or Colorado for vacation 
seems to be one such case. If Jane struggles with whether to fly to Hawaii or 
Colorado, we do not necessarily say that her valuing of Colorado is morally 
suspect even if she should later choose Hawaii.48 But with morally significant 
decisions (presumably the kind of decisions with respect to which one wants 
freedom), an agent cannot voluntarily accord value to a course of action that 
is morally blameworthy and retain her sinlessness. In the case of SFAs that 
47. This, however, is not to say that we agree with all such objections to agent causal theories.
48. Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” 161.
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are morally significant, we have argued that this is unavoidable for Kaneans, 
and this is why we think that Christians should not endorse this theory.49
49. Our thanks to anonymous reviewers, Nick Perovich, and to Betty Talbert for helpful 
advice on this paper.
